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The aim is to construct the free topos generated by a category. Up to equiv- 
alence, one may assume that each topos is equipped with a canonical choice of 
representative subobjects satisfying certain obvious conditions, and one insists 
that morphisms between toposes preserve these exactly. Between the category 
of small categories and that of toposes one inserts the category of “dogmas” 
(Volger’s closed logical categories). Dog is known to be equational over Cat, and 
it is here shown to be a reflective subcategory of Top. A dogma is a category with 
canonical fmite products, it has a Heyting algebra object Q which admits 
arbitrary objects as exponents such that, for each object A, the canonical morph- 
ism Sz + QA has a left adjoint 3, and a right adjoint VA , and it satisfies the usual 
axiom of extensionality (interpreted in the obvious way). The construction of 
the topos generated by a dogma follows Volger: its objects are “sets” 1 + QA 
and its morphisms are “relations” between sets which are universally defined and 
single valued. Inasmuch as a topos consists of sets, a.dogma consists of types, 
and we find here much of traditional type theory in a categorical setting, which 
incorporates both Frege’s process of set abstraction and something like Russell’s 
theory of description. 
INTRODUCTION 
As is well-known, Frege’s attempt to build mathematics on the theory of 
membership foundered on Russell’s paradox. Russell himself came to the 
rescue with his theory of types. Apparently, this was rejected by most mathe- 
maticians as too cumbersome, even though GodeI used a simplified form of 
type theory in his famous 1931 paper on undecidable propositions and Church 
produced a very elegant formulation of type theory in 1940. Instead, mathe- 
maticians favor two rival methods for patching up the original theory, those 
of Godel-Bernays and Zermelo-Fraenkel. Lawvere, in his elementary theory 
of the category of sets, rejected the theology of the membership relation alto- 
gether and replaced it by the dialectics of adjoint functors. Later Lawvere 
and Tierney introduced the now flourishing notion of an “elementary topos,” 
which provides a bridge between algebraic geometry and logic. Their view is 
that the category of sets is only one of many toposes. 
The present author became interested in an equational approach to founda- 
tions and, at the Halifax conference in 1971, proposed the name “dogma” 
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for certain structured categories which were related to type theory a la Church 
as toposes are related to set theory: 
dogmas toposes 
type theory = set theory ’ 
Dogmas are “equational” over categories (or over graphs for that matter) in 
much the same way that groups are equational over sets, and one can easily 
construct the free dogma generated by any category. 
Since toposes are dogmas, one may ask whether each dogma freely generates 
a topos. That this is indeed so seems to have occurred independently to several 
people (including the author), but priority clearly belongs to Volger, who 
presented his ideas in Oberwolfach in 1972 and widely distributed preprints 
of his [29], the publication of which was unduly delayed. Our dogmas are 
essentially his “closed logical categories”; in fact, both may be viewed as special 
cases of Lawvere’s “hyperdoctrines.” We have retained the term “dogma” 
for brevity and because the forgetful functor from Dog to Cat seems to amuse 
anglophone audiences. 
Gadgets similar to dogmas have been investigated by Benabou (“formal 
toposes”) and Joyal. The essential point in Volger’s construction of the free 
topos was rediscovered by Fourman, Coste, and Boileau, all of whom replaced 
Volger’s closed logical categories by certain languages akin to type theory. 
(Similar languages had been investigated by many people, e.g., Mitchell, 
Freyd, BCnabou, Osius, and Rattray and Dana Schlomiuk.) The difference 
between their approach and ours may be expressed by yet another proportion: 
dogmas 
type theory = 
algebraic theories a la Lawvere 
universal algebra B la Birkhoff 
Aside from technical differences, there are three points in which the present 
elaboration differs from Volger’s pioneering article. The first involves an 
approach through indeterminates already described in two earlier papers, 
really a categorical version of combinatory logic. The second is a detailed 
investigation of description in dogmas, a process which is known to work in 
toposes. The third point has to do with the universal property of the topos 
generated by a dogma: while Volger obtains the category of toposes as a full 
subcategory of Dog which is reflective up to isomorphism, we exhibit Top as 
a reflective subcategory of Dog which is full up to isomorphism. 
Briefly, a dogma is a category with finite products, it has a Heyting algebra 
object Sz which admits powers QA for all objects A, the canonical morphism 
fi + QA has a right adjoint VA and a left adjoint 3A , and the axiom of exten- 
sionality holds. 
Given any object A of a dogma, one may adjoin an indeterminate morphism 
X: 1 --f A to the dogma, much as one adjoins an indeterminate x to a commuta- 
tive ring. Set abstraction is now provable (as a special case of X-abstraction): 
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given any polynomial P(X): 1 -+ L2 (usually called a “propositional function”), 
there exists a unique morphism f: A + Q not involving x such that fx = p(x). 
The associated morphism rf l: 1 + SA is written {X E A 1 p(x)}. Morphisms 
1 -+ SZA are called “sets,” although “predicates” might have been a better 
term. Of course, these sets are nonstandard, as long as we do not impose all 
the axioms the category of sets should satisfy. In particular, the underlying 
logic is intuitionistic. 
Propositions appear as morphisms 1 -+ J2 in a dogma. Whenever the proposi- 
tion VmA 3!,,,p(x, y) is equal to the proposition true, one would like to exhibit 
a morphism g: A + B such that the proposition VzeA p(x, gx) is equal to true. 
That this is possible in a Boolean topos was proved by Mitchell. We show that 
the same result holds in a dogma, provided only the singleton morphism B -+ P 
is an equalizer of two morphisms into some power of 8. 
With Volger we assert that the topos T(Ul) generated by a dogma GY has as 
objects sets 1 -+ L2A and as morphisms functions, that is, binary relations 
between sets which are universally defined and single valued. One may ask 
whether the embedding H: O? -+ T(a) has the expected universal property: 
for every elementary topos d and every morphism G: GZ+ d in the category 
of dogmas, there exists a unique morphism G’: T(a) -+ 6’ in the category of 
toposes such that G’H = G. Such a result was obtained by Volger, but his G’ 
was a pseudofunctor and it was only unique up to isomorphism. To assure 
that G’ is a functor and unique, we assume that each object in a topos is provided 
with a canonical set of representative subobjects and that morphisms between 
toposes preserve these canonical subobjects. Fortunately, every elementary 
topos is equivalent to a topos with canonical subobjects. 
The present results were presented at the Oberwolfach conference in 1974 
and preliminary versions of this article were circulated in 1974, 1975, and 1977. 
1. WHAT Is x? 
Concerning the nature of the variable x in mathematics, different points of 
view are possible. Physicists and writers of calculus textbooks are fond of 
regarding x as a variable quantity, while several people (Curry, Menger, Quine) 
have argued at times that variables could or should be done away with. We 
shall take the position that variables are indeterminates, as in algebra. 
What is the situation in algebra ? One adjoins an indeterminate x to a commu- 
tative ring A and obtains the so-called “polynomial ring” A[x] together with 
a homomorphism h: A -+ A[$]. This process has several aspects, all of which 
will be seen to give rise to significant analogies later. 
(1) Universal property. For each ring homomorphism f: A -+ B and 
each element b E B there exists a unique ring homomorphism f I: A[x] -+ B 
such thatf’h =f andf'(x) = 6. 
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_ (2) Construction. One defines apolynomiaZf(x) as a word in the language 
of ring theory, e.g.,f(x) = (X + 2) x2 + (-1), modulo an equivalence relation 
=$ to assure the usual laws of ring theory, e.g., (f(x) + g(x)) h(x) =z 
f(x) 44 + &> 44. 4x1 th en consists of the polynomials (modulo =.J with 
obvious ring operations, and h: A -+ A[x] sends the element a of A onto its 
equivalence class modulo =z . One easily checks that the universal property is 
satisfied. 
(3) Normal form. It appears that each polynomial can be written uniquely 
in the form f (x) == a, + a,x + .*. + a,x”. Some writers like to define poly- 
nomials by such simplified expressions, but it should be noted that (3) is peculiar 
to commutative rings, while (1) and (2) hold equally for other algebraic systems, 
for example, for noncommutative rings. 
(4) Variabks explained away. In view of (3) above, one can define a 
polynomial as an essentially finite sequence of elements of A, but then the 
operations of addition and multiplication must be defined very carefully, the 
latter in a manner not intuitively obvious. 
We are not interested in commutative rings here, but, for a start, in Cartesian 
categories, that is, categories with canonical finite products. For us a Cartesian 
category a will consist of two classes, the class LY,, of objects (or formulus) and 
the class a1 of morphisms (or proofs), together with two mappings 0&--t 02; 
called “source” and “target.” We write f :  A --f B to mean that the morphism f  
has the object A as source and the object B as target. (This may also be read: 
f  is a “proof” of the “sequent” A -+ B.) Among the objects there is a specified 
object 1, and for any two objects A and B there is a specified object A x B. 









&)f = hkf) 
OA: A-+1 T*,~: A x B-+A 
it&: A x B+B 
f: C+Ag: C-+B 
(f,g):C+ A x B 
(assuming h: C + D) (assuming f :  A - 1) (assuming h: C -+ A x B). 
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Forgetting about the equations, we have here a deductive system, the “calculus 
of conjunction.” It would be more familiar if we wrote 1 = T, A x B = A A B. 
Let A be an object of the Cartesian category fl, we shall attempt to adjoin 
an indeterminate morphism X: 1 + A to a. We shall obtain the “polynomial 
Cartesian category” @[LX] together with a “Cartesian functor” H: fZ+ O@], 
that is, a functor which preserves the Cartesian structure exactly, e.g., 
H(C x B) = H(C) x H(B), H(vcC,J = ST~(~),~~). (Actually, x: 1 + H(A).) 
(1) Unierersal property. For each Cartesian functor F: 0?+ 99 and each 
morphism b: 1 -F(A) in 68 there exists a unique Cartesian functorF’: 0![x] -+ 99 
such that F’H = F and F’(x) = b. 
(2) CoMruction. We form a “deductive system” as follows: Its formulas 
are those of GZ, that is, the objects of GE Its axioms are all morphisms f: C + B 
of GZ, together with the “assumption” x: 1 + A. Its rules are those of a Cartesian 
category. The set of proofs is the smallest set containing the axioms and closed 
under the rules. We then obtain a Cartesian category by introducing an equiva- 
lence relation == between proofs. (It is understood that f ==zg only if f and g 
have the same source and target.) In fact, =* is the smallest equivalence relation 
which respects the equations and implications between equations of a Cartesian 
category. For example, (hg)f =# h(gf) and, if f =2 f’ and g =,g’, then 
gf =% g’f ‘. To avoid cumbersome notation, we shall regard =$ as the 
equality relation in a[~]. One easily checks that the universal property (1) is 
satisfied. 
(3) Normal form. Cartesian categories have the following property of 
functional completeness: Given any polynomial f(x): C -+ B in the indeterminate 
x: 1 -+ A, there exists a unique morphism g = Knf (2): A x C + B already 
in CII such that g(x0, , lc) =$ f (zc). Forgetting about the equations, we extract 
from this a form of the deduction theorem: If f(x): C-+ B is a proof of the 
sequent C+ B from the assumption x: T + A, then there exists a proof of 
A A C -+ B not depending on this assumption. We shall sketch a proof of 
functional completeness in Section 2. 
(4) Variables explained away. It turns out that A x -: cpI+ O! is the 
functor part of a cotriple on Q! and that functional completeness may be inter- 
preted as saying that ~Y[x] is the Kleisli category of this cotriple. 
One may, of course, construct a[x] as this Kleisli category, with its curious 
definition of composition. However, the earlier construction (2) is more general, 
as it applies to other structured categories, e.g., to monoidal categories, for 
which functional completeness does not hold. 
The observation that the Kleisli category of the above cotriple has the universal 
property of a[x] was already made by Volger [28], although he does not 
mention Kleisli categories by name. He calls our variables “constants,” and 
he considers a set of constants at once. 
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2. FUNCTIONAL COMPLETENESS OF CARTJWAN CATEGORIES 
We shall now sketch a proof of functional completeness. The construction 
of Kzf(x) proceeds by induction on the length of f(x): C -+ B. We consider 
four cases: f(s) = f d oes not depend on X; f(x) =x; f(x) = (g(x),h(x)); 
f(x) = h(x) g(x). In the last two cases it is assumed that at least one of the g(x) 
or h(x) depends on X. 
%f =f&.c > 
where D is the source of g(x). 
One also checks by induction on the length off(x) that Knf (X)(x& , 1,) =. 
f(x). Finally, one must prove that K,f (X) does not depend on the form of the 
polynomial f(x): if f(x) =,g(x), h t en K%f(x) = K%g(X). Indeed, the latter 
equation defines an equivalence relation = between polynomials which satisfies 
all the eight defining conditions of =z. But == was the smallest equivalence 
relation satisfying these eight conditions, hence f (2) =2g(x) implies f (x) 5 g(x). 
For details of the above argument, the reader is referred to [16], where also 
the following three corollaries are drawn. 
First, it is shown that H,: GY-t 0Z[x] is faithful, that is, for f,g: C-t B, 
f ==g implies f = g, provided Hom( 1, A) is nonempty. That some such 
restriction is necessary is readily seen by considering a Cartesian category 
with an initial object 0 # 1. Adjoining an indeterminate x: 1 + 0, one easily 
deduces that f =zg in a[~], for any two morphisms f, g: 1 -+ B in LY. Indeed, 
if 0,: 0 -+ 1, we have f0, = go, , hence fO,x =,gO,+; but 00~ =% 1, , hence 
f =zg. (See also Proposition 7.3 below.) 
Second, the universal property (1) is exploited to extract from (3) the fact 
that, for any a: 1 ---f A in 6Y, Kzf (x)(aO, , l> = f (a). 
Third, we have the following special case of functional completeness, which 
is used frequently: Given any polynomial f(x): I -+ B in the indeterminate 
x: 1 + A, there exists a unique morphism g: A -+ B already in GZ such that 
gx =,fW 
We shall investigate the effect of a Cartesian functor on tcf (x). Let there be 
given a Cartesian functor G: a--+ 9? and indeterminates x: 1 + A over d 
and x’: 1 -+ G(A) over a’. In view of the universal property of olljc], we may 
extend G to a unique Cartesian functor G’: LY[x] + g[x’] such that G’(x) = x’ 
and the following square commutes: 
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Applying G’ to the equation 
in OQx], we obtain 
‘+,ftWx’Oo(c, , led =o’ G’(ftx)) 
in a[~‘]. It then follows from functional completeness that 
G(‘bf(X)) = ‘WG’(f(X)). 
We have thus shown the following result: 
PROPOSITION 2.1. Suppose G: O?+ 39 is a Cartesian functor and x: 1 + A, 
x’: 1 + G(A) are indeterminates over Ol and 8, respectively. If G is extended to 
G’: ad[x] + ~J[x’] such that G(x) = x’, then G(K,f (x)) = K,‘G’(f (x)). 
3. ONE INDETERMINATE SUFFICES 
When it comes to two indeterminates, one has the choice of adjoining them 
simultaneously or consecutively. To simplify the discussion, we shall adopt 
the second point of view. Instead of writing x: 1 + A, we shall often say that x 
is an indeterminate of type A. 
Authors concerned with the language of type theory usually insist on listing 
a countable number of variables for each type, to be prepared for all eventualities. 
Indeed, if one wishes, one may adjoin a whole set or even class of indeterminates 
at once. However, in any particular application, a finite number of indeterminates 
will do since any formula that can be written down at all involves only a finite 
number of variables. As we shall see, already in a Cartesian category, a finite 
number of indeterminates may be replaced by a single one. 
PROPOSITION 3.1. If we successively adjoin in&terminates x of type A and y 
of type 3 to the Cartesian category ad, we obtain the Cartesian category 
@ll[Yl= ma13 wher e z is an indeterminate of type A x B. 
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Proof. Let F: O@] + QZ[x][y] be the unique Cartesian functor such that 
F(z) = (x, y) and the following square commutes: 
/2![,z] ----F---+ @x][y] 
t t 
oz ’ a[4 
Let G,: a[~] + 6?![z] be the unique Cartesian functor such that G,(X) = wz 
and the following triangle commutes: 
Q?[x] - - - 5 - - + a[,%] 
2/ 
a 
Let G: QZ[x][y] --+ a[z] be the unique Cartesian functor such that G(y) = n’s 
and the following triangle commutes: 
One easily checks that GF(z) = z and that the following triangle commutes: 
Therefore, GF is the identity functor on a[~]. 
Similarly, one shows that FG is the identity functor on a[x][y]. 
COROLLARY 3.2. Every Jinite transcendental extension of a Cartesian category 
is isomorphic to a simple transcendental extension. 
We shall resist the temptation to discuss infinite transcendental extensions 
and refer the reader to Volger [28] instead. 
In view of Proposition 3.1, we shall often denote an indeterminate of type 
A x B by (x, y), where x and y  are indeterminates of types A and B, respec- 
tively. 
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4. THE CATEGORY OF DOGMAS 
Functional completeness holds not only for Cartesian categories, but also 
for Cartesian closed categories (for each B in GZ, the functor - x B: a-+ Ol 
is assumed to have a right adjoint), even for Cartesian closed categories with 
additional equational structure, as long as there are essentially no new rules 
(but new operations, axioms, and equations are permitted). Unfortunately, 
functional completeness does not hold for toposes, or even for categories with 
finite limits. Indeed, in that situation, that is, in the category of categories 
with finite limits, adjoining an indeterminate x of type A leads to a/A (see 
[ll], 5.11.2), which is isomorphic to the Eilenberg-Moore category of the 
cotriple mentioned in (4) above. 
Nonetheless, we may form a[~] inside the category of Cartesian categories, 
even when GY is a topos, as long as we do not expect 0Z[x] to be a topos. After 
all, when F is a field, F[x] is a commutative ring and not a field, although there 
is a well-known process which embeds F[x] into a field F(x). 
We shall see that, without loss of information, toposes may be approximated 
by certain systems that possess functional completeness. Such a system will be 
called a “dogma.” Inasmuch as a topos is a categorical version of set theory, 
albeit nonstandard, a dogma is a categorical version of type theory. We shall 
see later that a dogma may be embedded into a topos in a manner analogous 
to the embedding of a commutative ring into a field. 
A predogma is a Cartesian category 0Z with a specified object Sz and for each 
object B of CPI an object PB of 0? satisfying the following new axiom, rule, and 
equations: 





We have thus assured a natural isomorphism Hom(A x B, 52) E Hom(A, PB) 
and we might have written sZB in place of PB. 
In any predogma, one has 
Hom(A, 8) s Hom( 1 x A, Q) z Ho4 1, PA). 
It is often desirable to pass from a morphismf: A + 52 to the associated “set” 
rfl: 1 -+ PA (the corners are Lawvere’s, not Quine’s): 
* ‘If’ = (fml A) * 
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In the converse direction, with any “set” cy: 1 -+ PA one associates the mor- 
phism cJ: A + 52, where 
ar( = l .4(aoA , IA). 
These two constructions are illustrated by the following “proof trees”: 
1xA-tA ALL’ A-+1 l%PA 
IxA-tQ A+PA A-+A 
I-+PA A-+PA x A PAxA+Q 
A-tSZ 
A dogma is a predogma with additional axioms (morphisms): 
true, false: 1 --f Q, 
A, v, a: L? x sz+Q, 
VA, 3,: PA-L?, 
which satisfy an essentially finite number of equations. 
Instead of writing these equations down, we shall first say what we want to 
accomplish with them. We want to use the above data to define a binary relation 
Ga (usually written without the subscript) on each Hom(A, 0). This relation 
is to satisfy the following conditions (we write f A g for h(f, g), etc.): 
(1) f Gf; 
(2) if f < g and g <f, then f = g; 
(3) if f <g and g < h, then f < h; 
(4) if f < g, then fk < gk; 
(5) f < me 0, , 
(5’) false 0, <f, 
(6) h ,(fAgiffh <fandh <g; 
(6’) f vg<hifff<handg<h; 
(7) f hg<hiffg,(f=+h; 
(8) f < vBv* ififrA.B G P; 
(8’) 3ev* <f iff v < fnA,B; for all f, g, h: A-Q, k: B -+ A and 
qx A x B-+9; 
(9) the axiom of extensionality (we defer a statement of this until 
Section 6). 
What do these conditions mean I 
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Conditions (1) to (4) assert that Q is an ordered object of the category Cl!, 
in the following sense: the functor Hom(-, B): G!“‘* + Sets can be lifted to 
the category Ord of partially ordered sets, that is, there exists a functor 
G!P + Ord such that the following triangle commutes: 
Sets 
where Ord + Sets is the usual forgetful functor. 
One easily sees that finite products and internal powers of ordered objects 
(if they exist) are also ordered. In particular, since 8 is ordered so are 1, Q x Sz, 
and PB. Indeed, the order of Hom(A, 1) is trivial, the order of Hom(A, 52 x 52) 
is defined by 
<f, g> B <f ‘9 $5 i f f  f <f’ and g <g’, 
and the order of Hom(A, PB) is defined by comparison with Hom(A x B, Q), 
that is, for q, #: A -+ PB, 
where q~+ = d~A.B 9 $B>- 
I f  .Q1 and J2, are ordered objects, it becomes possible to say that u: s2, -+ 9, 
has a left adjoint v: Szs + Qr , namely, 
for all fi: A -+ 52, and fi: B -+ Q, . A more concise way of saying this is 
Conditions (5), (6), and (8) and (5’), (6’), and (8’) now assert that 
0,: Q+ 1, (lo ) ln): Q + s;) x L?, rr& : !2-+ PA 
have right adjoints 
true, A, VA 
and left adjoints 
false, V, 3, , 
respectively. Condition (7) also has the form of an adjunction. 
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It is clear from the above conditions that 
fGg if f  fAg=f, 
so this could serve as a definition of <. Another possibility would have been: 
f  *g = true. 
Conditions (1) to (4) may now be replaced by three equations: 
fhf=f, fhg=gAf, (f * $3 * h = f A (g * 47 
which are to hold for all f ,  g, and h. 
It is not difficult to restate the equations without the implicit quantification 
over elements of Hom(A, 9). In fact, taking A = Sz and f  = lo, the first 
equation specializes to 
A <L2 > L2> = L2 > 
and multiplying this equation by f  on the right, one recaptures f A f = f. 
In the same way, the second equation may be rewritten 
and a similar reformulation applies to the third equation. 
The adjointness relations (5), (6), and (8) may be written as follows: 
lo < true 0, , 
la < A a2 , LA A < ~w2, A < b,o 1 
L2 < \d A6T.A 5 v ATPA.A < <A 
as is easily seen. Their duals (5’), (6’), and (8’) may be reformulated similarly, 
and (7) may be written 
These 14 inequalities (depending on the object A) may be replaced by 14 equa- 
tions if < is eliminated in favor of A and =. 
Together with the axiom of extensionality, the discussion of which has been 
postponed, we thus have 18 equations (depending on A). I f  it were desirable, 
we could combine these 18 equations into one, by repeated use of the rule that 
f Gf’ and g <g’ i f f  <f, g> < <f ‘, g’>. 
As morphisms between dogmas (predogmas) we shall take functors which 
preserve their structure exactly. We shall call such functors orthodox (pre- 
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o&&ox). Clearly, a preorthodox functor is Cartesian. Moreover, a preorthodox 
functor is orthodox if and only if it preserves true, false, A, V, +, V, and 3. 
We shall see later that it s&ices for some of these morphisms to be preserved. 
(To say that G: fl --t a preserves V means that G(VJ = Vcb) .) 
5. FUNCTIONAL COMPLETENESS FOR DOGMAS 
For esthetic and other reasons that will become clear later, we shall from 
now on replace the symbol = denoting equality in a dogma by *=.. 
Given an object A of the dogma a, one may adjoin an indeterminate x: 1 -+ A 
as in Section 1, only now there are many additional axioms and equations and 
one additional rule *, which affect the definition of “proof.” We again take 
.=. z as the smallest equivalence relation on proofs from, the assumption 
x: 1 + A which respects all equations and implications between equations. 
THEOREM 5.1. Functional completeness holds for predogmas and dogmus. 
Proof. We shall modify the proof sketched in Section 2 for Cartesian 
categories. One additional case now arises in the recursive definition of Kzf (x). 
Suppose f (x): C x B + 8, then f (x)*: C + PB. We put 
‘%(f(X)*) ‘=’ (‘%f (x) ‘%C.B)*, 
where ~4~,c,~: (A x C) x B+ A x (C x B) is the associativity morphism 
defined by 
The rest of the proof proceeds as above. See Proposition 3.5 of [16] for the 
details. 
We introduce some useful terminology: morphisms 1 + A are called entities 
of type A; in particular, entities of type D are propositions and entities of type PA 
are sets. 
COROLLARY 5.2. Given an indeterminate x of type A in a dogma and a 
polynomial p(x) of type J2 (propositional function), there is a unique set 01 * = * 
(x 1 p(x)} of type PA such that 
Proof. Take 
eA(a, x> ' = '0 p(x)* 
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where Y~,~: B x A + A x B is the commutativity morphism defined by 
This corollary may be viewed as a categorical version of set abstraction. This 
becomes even more evident if we rewrite ~~(a, x) as x E 01. 
As at the end of Section 2, we also have the following: 
COROLLARY 5.3. For any entity a of type A and any propositional function 
p(x) in the indeterminate x of type A in a dogma 
a E ix I P(x)> *=- PW 
It is sometimes useful to indicate the type of an indeterminate explicitly. 
Thus we may replace x by x E A and write 
UE{XEA /p(x)} *=-p(a). 
Let us also note the abbreviation 
(<x, y> E A x B I P(x, Y)) -=* {z E A x B 1 P(~A.B% 64,Bz)h 
In view of functional completeness, Proposition 2.1 remains valid in a dogma 
or predogma. In particular, we have the following application: 
COROLLARY 5.4. Suppose G: 62-t k% is a (pre)orthodox functor and x: 1 + A 
and x’: 1 + G(A) are indeterminates over csd and .SY’, respectively. If G is extended 
to G’ such that G’(x) = x’, then 
G({x E A I P(x)>) .=. {x’ E G(A) I G’Mx’))). 
Of course there is no harm in replacing x’ by x. 
6. INTERNAL LANGUAGE OF A DOGMA 
By the internal tasguqe of a dogma GZ or @[xl we mean the set of all proposi- 
tions, that is, morphisms 1 + 52. This internal language must be distinguished 
from the external or metalanguage, which is the theory of dogmas with names 
for the morphisms of GE 
If we do not distinguish between propositions and the expressions which 
denote them, we may regard the internal language as part of the metalanguage. 
Sometimes (as in Proposition 12.1 below) it may be possible to recapture the 
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external language (or at least its equational part) from the internal one, but in 
general this need not be the case. 
We shall not spell out, in the manner dear to logicians, recursive definitions 
of terms, formulas, etc., for the internal language. For us, this is merely the 
set of propositions, but among these are all the usual formulas of typed predicate 
calculus, as will be seen. 
First of all, we have the following “atomic” propositions: 
true, false, a E 01 (meaning E~(OI, a)). 
If p and q are propositions, we write 
7P for *(P,faW, 
P A q for NP, 4h 
P v q for WP9 q), 
P => 4 for =-0, qh 
P-=-qfor(P*dAk*P). 
If p(x) is a propositional function in the indeterminate x E A, we write 
V,, P(4 for VAX E A I P(x)}, 
&P(X) for UX E A I P(4). 
If a and j? are sets of type PA, we write 
orC/3forV&xEar * xE8). 
The symbol C is not to be confused with the symbol =& which is part of the 
metalanguage. Incidentally, the E in “x E A” belongs to the metalanguage too. 
If a and b are of type A, we write 
following Leibnitx. The symbol = should not be confused with the equality 
symbol in the metalanguage; this is the main reason why from Section 5 on 
we have been writing the latter as * =.. 
If a is an entity of type A, we write 
We also write 
(a} for {x E A 1 x = a}. 
607/36/2-2 
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In the presence of extensionality [see (9) below] this may be rewritten as 
The symbol < is a symbol of the metalanguage as has already been men- 
tioned. To bring us closer to traditional logic, we shall write 
pt-qforp<q,thatis,forphq*=.p, 
when p and q are propositions; similarly 
p(x) t-2 q(x) for P($ A q(x) . = ‘x P@h 
where p(x) and q(x) are propositional functions. 
Moreover, we write 
+q for true I- q, that is, for true . =’ q. 
The symbol t-Z may be used to cast the definition of a dogma into a form 
more familiar to logicians. 
We recall that, in view of functional completeness, there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between morphisms f: A -+ Sz in the predogma Q? and propo- 
sitional functions p(x): 1 --f Q in a[~], where x is an indeterminate of type A. 
This may be utilized to replace the inequality f <g by the more familiar 
entailment p(x) I---~ q(x). A n indeterminate of type 1 is usually omitted, so 
that p t- q may also be regarded as a special case of this. 
Thus, a dogma may be described as a predogma which satisfies the following 
conditions: 
( 1) PM f-z PC4 ; 
(2) ifp(x) t-z q(x) and q(x) hz ~(4, then ~(4 * =*% q(x); 
(3) if p(x) t--= q(x) ad q(x) I----~ y(x), then P(X) += T(X); 
(4) if p(x) += 44 thenpk(yN ‘II q(g(y)); 
(5) P(x) ez true; 
(5’) false b P(4; 
(6) r(x) I-% p(x) A q(x) iff r(x) +-% ~(4 and ~(4 +s q($ 
(6’) p(x) v q(x) e3: r(x) iff p(x) t-Z T(X) and q(x) +x T(X); 
(7) p@) A 9(x) ti G) iff a(4 f-= PC4 +- 44; 
(8) ~(4 +-= v&x, Y) iffP(x) I-<~,,> 4% Y>; 
(8’) $,o& Y) +--z ~(4 iff& Y) +-<z.v> P(h 
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for all p(x), q(x), r(x): 1 --+ Q, g(y): 1 -+ A and s(x, y): 1 -+ Sz, where x and y 
are indeterminate9 of types A and B, respectively. Finally we state the axiom 
of extensionality, which has been deferred until now: 
(9) t-\JUSPA v oe4wzsA@ E f.4 * x E 4 - (u = 4). 
We note the following special case of extensionality, which is obtained 
from (9) by taking A = 1 and noting that PI E an: 
(9’) +-VW2 V,&((U * 4 * (u = 4). 
Since many of the results that follow do not require extensionality, we shall 
indicate its use explicitly in cases where it is needed. 
7. MORE ABOUT DEDUCTION IN A DOGMA 
Not surprisingly, the symbol t- obeys the usual rules of intuitionistic natural 
deduction, some of which appear in Section 6. We also have the deduction 
theorem: 
Pt-q if and only if I-P a q 
as well as the usual rules of “universal specification” and “existential generaliza- 
tion”: For any entity a of type A, 
VSEA 4(x) + 4(4, 
For example, the first of these is shown as follows. Clearly, 
Therefore, by (8) above (with x of type 1 omitted and y replaced by x), we 
have 
VCVEA P(X) +a P(X). 
In view of Corollary 5.4, we may apply the “substitution functor” (the unique 
orthodox functor F: CY[x] --+ fl extending the identity functor cpI+ CPI such 
that F(X) = a) to this and obtain 
We also note the following useful equations: 
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For example, in the first equation we go from left to right by two universal 
specifications followed by one universal generalization (half of (8)) and from 
right to left by one universal specification followed by two universal generaliza- 
tions. 
We also have the following familiar rules of equality: 
t-u = a; a=bt-b=ua; u=bAb=c+u=c; 
a = b +f(u) =f(b); P=P+P*P* 
Here a, b, and c are entities of type A, f(x) is a polynomial of type B in an 
indeterminate of type A, and p and q are propositions. 
For example, we shall prove the last two of these. By definition, of equality, 
a = bl-vtr,,,,(uEy -=-bEY). 
Hence, by universal specification, 
a =bk-uaEabbE, 
where 01 is any set of type PA. 
In particular, take OL .=. {x E A If(u) =f(x)}. Then a E OL .=.f(u) =f(u) 
and b E pi .=.f(u) =f(b), hence a = b +f(u) =f(a) -f(u) =f(b). Since 
+f(u) =f(u), it follows that a = b *j(u) =f(b). 
On the other hand, take a *=a~, b .=* q, and a! .=. (t ~52 ) t}, then 
uEar.=.pandbeor.=.q,hencep=q+p-=q. 
We shall make occasional use of the following: 
3,&p(x) A x = a) *=. P(U)> 
which is easily proved. 
Of interest is the following connection between the equality in the meta- 
language and the equality in a dogma. 
PROPOSITION 7.1. If f, g: A -+ B are morphism in a dogma, then f * =* g 
implies t--VzEa fx = gx. The converse holds if B = Q or B = PC. 
Proof. The direct implication is evident. In the converse direction, first 
assume B = R. 
Suppose t-VnEA fx = gx, then t-= fx = gx. But fx = gx t-z fx c-gx, hence 
+fx “gx. From this we infer fx ~--~gx and gx +--* fx, hence fx ‘=‘z gx. 
Thus, by functional completeness, f  . =. g. 
Next, assume B = PC. As above, we deduce that I-(~,~) y E fx ey egx. 
Let f  +, g : : A x C -+ 52 correspond to f ,  g, then +---z f  fz ==-g+z. From this we 
deduce f  + . =. g+ as above, hence f  . =. g. 
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COROLLARY 7.2. If a and b are entities of type A in a dognta, then {u} *=. {b) 
if and only if I-U = b. When A = Q or A = PC, this implies a * = * b. 
Proof. Suppose {u} * =. (b}, then I-U E (u} o a E {b}. But a E {u} . =a true, 
hence +u E {b}, that is, I-U = b. 
Conversely, suppose I-U = b, then x = a . = .= x = b, that is, (a} (X * = s2 (6) Cx, 
and so {a} *=. {b}, by functional completeness. 
Now assume A = PC (Q z Pl is a special case of this). From +u = b we 
deduce t-z Vusl (X E u)y = (X E b) y. Applying Proposition 7.1 to the dogma 
a[~], we obtain x E a . = ‘5 x E 6, from which a . =* b by functional com- 
pleteness. 
PROPOSITION 7.3. If x is un indeterminate of type A in a dogma 4 then 
H,: a-t fl[x] is fuithful if und only if ?r>,,: A x C -+ C is epi for all objects C. 
This is true, in particular, if Hom(1, A) is tzonempty. 
Proof. Ha is faithful if and only if, for all f, g: C + B, f .=.zg implies 
f ‘=‘g. In view of functional completeness, f *=*,g if and only if &f -=* ~,,g, 
that is, fw>,c .=*g,r>,, . This will imply that f -=*g if and only if VT>,, is epi. 
Whenu: l+ A, wemayinferthatf *=*fiT;,c(a, lc) *=*gr’&u, lc) *=*g. 
COROLLARY 7.4. If Hom( 1, A) is nonempty, then from p I-~ q one may infer 
P I-- !7* 
To illustrate the significance of the above restriction on A, observe that in 
any dogma 
(i) VW, P(x) t-3 LA P(x), 
as we may deduce this from 
and 
Vzd P(X) +z P(x) 
However, we must not infer 
(ii) VseA $44 t-- LA PM 
which may well be false, for example, in the dogma of sets if A is the empty set. 
On the other hand, we may demonstrate (ii) when there is an entity a of 
type A. This may be seen, even without using Corollary 7.4, by observing that 
and 
v, P(X) + p(u) 
PC4 + LA PW 
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Note that Proposition 7.3 (but not Corollary 7.4) already holds in a Cartesian 
category. 
We shall now discuss a characterization of orthodox functors. But first we 
make the observation that in type theory one may quantify over propositional 
variables. 
Not only do we have 
false t-p 
for any proposition p, but also 
false t-W w 
for an indeterminate w of type Q. From this we easily deduce 
(a) t--V,,, false * w. 
In the same manner, one establishes 
(b) t- Vuen Vvea Vtoe~a ((u v 4 => 4 0 ttu + 4 * (v * 4)) 
and 
(4 t- v&t4 v&2 ((LA Y’X => 4 -CD v,,, (Y’X => wu)). 
Remark 7.5. A preorthodox functor G: a+ L% between dogmas is orthodox 
if and only if it preserves true, A, +, and V. 
Proof. Suppose the preorthodox functor G does preserve true, A, 2, and V. 
We shall show, for example, that it preserves V. In view of Corollary 5.4, we 
may apply G to (b) and obtain 
(b’) t- Vuen VvEsa VtER ((u v’ v) a t) + ((u 3 t) A (v 3 t)) in .?Z!, where 
V’ .=. G(V). But (b) also holds in a!, and from (b) and (b’) we easily obtain 
+ VuaR vvss;, ((u “’ 4 o (u ” o)), 
from which one may deduce that V’ .=. V. 
In the same way, letting G(3,) .=. 3&,, , we deduce from (c) that 
t- vlysPG(A) (%4,Y * 3,(&Y), 
from which it follows that 3’,o, .=. So(A) , by Proposition 7.1. 
Remark 7.6. As Prawitz has already pointed out, false, v  , and 3 may actually 
be defined in terms of true, A, 3, and V. Thus we may put 
false -=. V,,, t, 
P ” 4 -=* vta2 (((P * t> * (4 * t)) 3 4, 
L4 PW . =. VtsR (VOEA (P(X) =b- 4 +- 4, 
and deduce conditions (5’), (6’), and (8’) of Section 6. 
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This observation implies that the definition of a dogma given in Section 6 
may be simplified by omitting conditions (5’), (6’), and (8’). 
Remurk 7.7. In a dogma (with extensionality) we may define A, *, and V 
in terms of =. Thus a preorthodox functor between dogmas (with extensionality) 
is orthodox if and only if preserves true and =. Indeed 
P A 9 . =* <P, 9> = <true, tW>, 
P*q*=*(PA!l) =P, 
V,,,p(x) -=*{xEA jp(x)} ={xEA 1 true>. 
Proof. For example, the right-hand side of the last equation may be rewritten 
with the help of (9) as VseA (p(x) o true), that is, VzEA p(x). 
Note that we could also write 
true -=- 0, = 0,) 
but we shall have no need to do so. 
8. DESCRIPTION IN A DOGMA 
Ever since Bertrand Russell, logicians are fond of postulating a description 
operator, which, supposing that Gl!,,,p(y), allows them to name an entity b 
such that +p(b). Mitchell first observed that such an entity b exists in a Boolean 
topos, even if p(y) involves another variable. We shall see that this result holds 
already in a dogma, provided the “singleton morphism” 6: B -+ PB is an 
equalizer of two morphisms into some PC. 
The singleton morphism us is most easily defined by functional completeness 
as the unique morphism B -+ PB such that ~sy *=*y {y}, for an indeterminate 
y of type B. It may also be described as cg * =. 8% , where $,l * = * 
((y, y’) f B x B 1 y = y’}, as is easily verified. 
A morphism tn: B + A will be called a P-regular monomorphism if it is an 
equalizer of two morphisms f,g: A + PC for some object C. We shall see 
presently that 6s: B --t PB is a P-regular monomorphism if B = Sz or B = PC. 
In general, there is no reason to assume that Lo is even a monomorphism. When 
B = 52 or B = PC this is easily deduced from Corollary 7.2 and functional 
completeness. 
LEMMA 8.1. Let m be a P-regular monomorphism in a dogma, and suppose 
that + VZEA 3,,, my = fx, where f: A -+ C. Then there exists a (unique) g such 
that mg = f. 
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Proof. Let m be the equalizer of u, v: C--+ PD. Then 
t-urn = urn, 
hence 
my =fx +c5.y> ufx = vfx, 
and therefore, by (8’) of Section 6 (existential specification), 
3,,, my = fx +z i4fx = vfx. 
But, by supposition, 
+z LB my =fx, 
hence 
b2: ufx = vfx, 
and so, by universal generalization, 
t- v,, ufx = vfx, 
from which, by Proposition 7.1, 
uf *=. vf .  
Since m was the equalizer of u and v, the existence of g follows. 
PROPOSITION 8.2. Suppose m: B -+ C is a P-regular monomorphism in a 
dogma, and let 
rh,l *=*{z~C13,,~my =ss}. 
Then h, is a characteristic morphism of m, that is, m is an equalizer of h,,, and 
true 0, . 









f- VroA LB my = fx. 
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By Lemma 8.1, there is a unique g: A+ B such that mg *=-f, as was to be 
proved. 
THEOREM 8.3. L-et B be an object in a dogma for which the singleton morphism 
Lo: B + PB is a P-regular monomorphism. Suppose + VE,, 3!,B p(x, y), then 
there is a unique g: A --f B such that I- VzEA p(x, gx). In fact, y = gx -=‘<e,v> 
PC% Y). 
Proof. By Proposition 8.2, Lo has a characteristic morphism hs , where 
‘hB’ * = * {z E PB 1 &{ y} = x}. 
We may assume that 
P@s Y) * =‘<#,r> Y efx, 
where) A + PB is given by fx -=-* {y E B 1 P(x, y)}. NOW 
Thus 
‘hBf’ -=-{x~A13~~{y} =fx} 
*=*{xEA I %,P(~,Y)) 
-=-{xEAI true} 
-=* ‘true 0,‘. 
hBf *=a trueO,, , 
hence there exists a unique g: A + B such that 
therefore, 
Thus 
Lgg *=* f, 
p(x, gx) . = ‘a gx efx 
*=*,gxE(gx} 
* = ‘* true. 
+a! P(X, gx), 
and the result follows by universal generalization. 
From I-,p(x, gx) we also deduce that y = gx v-(~,~> p(x, y), and the con- 
verse entailment holds since bl: ?I!,,,, fix, y). 
men B = Q or B = PC, Theorem 8.3 may be improved by giving an 
explicit construction for g. 
PROPOSITION 8.4. Suppose (a) B = Sz o+ (b) B = PC, and +VsoA 3!,B 
p(x, y). Then there is a unique g: A --t B such that I- V,, p(x, gx) giwm by 
136 JOACHIM LAMBEK 
(4 gx *=a= 3~2 (t A P(x, t)), 
(b) gx -=*e 1~ E C I Lm (x E w * P(X, WI)>. 
In fact, y = gx ‘=‘<z.y> P(% Y). 
Proof. Since X2 E PI, it is clear that (a) may be obtained as a special case 
of (b). We shall prove (b). 
Define upc: P(PC) + PC by 
s being an indeterminate of type P(PC). One easily checks that upc+c *=a lpc . 
Hence cpc is the equalizer of +CupC and lp(pc) and thus a P-regular monomor- 
phism. 
We may now apply Theorem 8.3 and obtain a (unique) g such that I-,p(x, gx). 
Then clearly 
The converse entailment holds also, since t-Z J!,,,,p(x, w). Therefore 
x EP ‘=‘(a/> LPC (x E w * P(X, w)). 
By functional completeness, 
gx *=‘z {.z E c I &EPC (x E w A P(X, w))l. 
9. TOP AS A SUBCATEGORY OF DOG 
An elementary topos is a predogma with a morphism true: 1 + Q such that 
(*) every morphism into Q is a characteristic morphism of some 
monomorphism; 
(*c) every monomorphism has a characteristic morphism; 
(***) characteristic morphisms are unique. 
We recall that h: A -+ Q is a characteristic morphism of m: B -+ A if m is an 
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We did not postulate the existence of equalizers in general; but these may 
be shown to exist. 
Indeed, let 8,: C x C + IR be the characteristic morphism of (lc , 1,): 
c-tcxc. 
Suppose f, g: A + C are such that 
S&f, g) *=* true 0” . 
Then there exists a unique k: A + C such that 
hence 
Now let u, v: B + C, then e: A -+ B equalizes u and v if and only if 
that is, 
ue *=* ve 
6,-u, v)e *=. S,(ue, se) -=- true 0, , 
that is, e equalizes 6&u, v) and true 0, . Now an equalizer of the latter two 
morphisms is assumed to exist by (*), hence u and v have an equalizer. 
In view of Remark 7.7, we are led to define A, =z-, and VA in a topos as follows: 
These definitions are easily seen to be equivalent to the usual ones, as stated 
by Lawvere in his 1972 “Introduction.” 
It is well-known that a topos satisfies conditions (1) to (8) of a dogma. The 
axiom of extensionality (9) appears in Fourman [S]. We shall prove a 
slightly more general result here. 
PROPOSITION 9.0. Extemionality hola3 in anypredogma satisfying conditions (1) 
to (8) in which characteristic mmphisms are unique. 
Proof. Let 
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Take any morphisms f, g: B -+ PA, then 
is equivalent to 
yACf2 g> .=. true OB 
y,dfy, gy) . = ‘y true, 
for an indeterminate y: 1 --t B, in view of functional completeness. By definition 
of set abstraction, this is equivalent to 
Now let f: B -+ PA correspond to f +: A x B + Q, then this may be written 
I-V <s.v>eAXB (f +(% Y> og+<x, Y)h 
that is, by Proposition 7.1, 
f +c? Y> ‘=‘<x.v> g+<x, Y>. 
By functional completeness this is the same as f + . =. gf, which is equivalent 
to f e=. g. Thus yA is a characteristic morphism of (1, , IpA), which is a 
split monomorphism, hence P-regular. I f  characteristic morphisms are unique, 
yA must coincide with the characteristic morphism predicted by Proposition 8.2, 
hence 
‘?A’ ‘=* {(% v> E PA x PA 1 %,ePA(lPA , l,)w = <% v>: 
.=.{(u,o)~pA x PA)u=v}. 
From this the result follows readily. 
It is clear from (M) in the definition of a topos that every monomorphism 
is P-regular. In particular, Proposition 8.2 then gives a construction for the 
unique characteristic morphism of a monomorphism. It follows that orthodox 
functors between toposes preserve characteristic morphisms exactly, hence 
they also preserve equalizers up to isomorphism. 
For this reason, toposes and orthodox functors form a full subcategory of 
Dog. 
We should point out that our definition of “elementary topos” differs slightly 
from that given in [19], inasmuch as we postulate finite products as part of the 
structure and not just the existence of finite products, and the same goes for 
powers of Sz. 
We shall say that an elementary topos has canonical subobjects if to each 
object A, there is associated a representative set Sub A of monomorphisms 
B -+ A with the following properties: 
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(i) Every monomorphism B -+ A is isomorphic to exactly one element 
ofSubA. 
(ii) l,:A+AisinSubA. 
(iii) Iff:B-+A is in SubA andg:D+C is in SubC, thenf xg: 
B x D-+A x CisinSub(A x C). 
(iv) Iff: B + A is in Sub A, then Pf: PB -+ PA is in Sub(PA). 
(v) IffiB-+AisinSubAandg:C+BisinSubB,thengf:C+A 
is in Sub A. 
We point out that already in a Cartesian category one may define 
and in a dogma one may define pf as the unique morphism such that, for an 
indeterminate v of type PB, 
(Pf )v *=‘V 1~ e A I L, (13 = * A Y E v)>- 
Thus P is here regarded as a covariant functor oI+ a. 
In a topos with canonical subobjecta there is a bijection 
char 
Sub A -ker + Hom(A, Q), 
where 
and 
charm = characteristic morphism of m 
ker m = kernel of m 
= the element of Sub A which is an equalizer of h and trrce 0, . 
We write Ker m for the domain of ker m. 
We record the following for later use. 
LEMMA 9.1. In a topos with cancmicat subobjects, the folkxuing equations hold: 
(i) ker(true 0,) *=* lA , 
(ii) ker(h(f x g)) -=a kerf x kerg, 
(iii) ker(Pp’), . =- P(ker@()), 
wheref:A+Q,g:B-+Q,/kl+PBand 
Here (iii) depends on extensionality. 
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is a pullback, we have 
IA E ker(true 0,). 
Since lA is in Sub A, the isomorphism may be replaced by equality. 
(ii) Consider the following diagram: 
AxB f&7 l Dx52A-D 
kerfx kers 
t 
true x true 
t t 
true 
Kerf x Ker g OKerfXOKers' 1 x l 01X1 l l 
The square on the left is a Cartesian product of two pullbacks, hence is itself 
a pullback. The square on the right is isomorphic to the pullback 
DXQ “-a 
<true, true> t t t”ll.? 
l-1 
which serves as the definition of A in a topos. As is well-known, the juxta- 
position of two pullbacks yields a pullback, hence 
ker(A(f x g)) g kerf x kerg. 
But kerf x kerg is in Sub A, hence the isomorphism may be replaced by 
equality. 
To prove (iii), it suffices to show that 
(P/3)( *=* char(P(ker(@‘))). 
Put ker(b() ’ =. m, then /Y . =. char m, so we want to show that 
(1) P(rchar ml) .=. ‘char(Pm)‘. 
Now, the left side of (1) is 
(V E PB j v C ‘char ml}, 
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and, in view of Proposition 8.2, this is 
On the other hand, Pm is defined to be the unique morphism such that, for 
an indeterminate w of type PC, 
hence, the right-hand side of (1) is, in view of Proposition 8.2, 
{w E PB / awePC (Pm)w = w} 
.=.(wEPB~~~~~~{~~BBI~~~~=~AzEw}=w}. 
Thus we want to prove the equivalence in a[w] of the following two propositions 
(in view of extensionality): 
(2) v,d (Y E f~ * SEC mz = Y), 
(3) Lpc V,,B (Y E 7~ * Lc (mz = Y * 2 E 4). 
That (3) implies (2) is an exercise in the predicate calculus. To show that (2) 
implies (3), let us assume (2) and put 
m-lw .=. v{~~CIm2~w}, 
then we deduce 
ygw s- 3Zec(mx =y h zem-lw). 
But, since 
2 E m-lw 0 m2 e 0, 
we also have the converse implication, hence 
V,,, (y E 0 0 3,,c (mz = y h 2 E m-lw)), 
from which (3) follows by existential generalization. 
We are interested in forming a category Top whose objects are elementary 
toposes with canonical subobjects. What are the morphisms of this category ? 
They are of course the usual “logical morphisms” (suitably canonified) and 
are defined by the equivalent conditions of the following: 
LEMMA 9.2. Let G: @+ S3 be a functor between elementary toposes with 
canonical subobjects. Then the following two statements are equiwalent: 
(a) G is orthodox and preserves canonical subobjects; 
(b) G is preorthodox and preserves canonical kernels. 
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Proof. Suppose (a), then surely G is preorthodox. In view of Proposition 8.2, 
G preserves characteristic morphisms, hence it preserves canonical kernels, 
since ker is inverse to char. 
Suppose (b), then G preserves characteristic morphisms, since char is inverse 
to ker. Hence G preserves true, A, 0, and V, in view of their usual definitions 
as characteristic morphisms of lr: 1 + 1, (true, true): 1 --+D x 9, (lo, lo): 
.Q -+ 52 x Q, and 'true 0,’ : 1 + PA, respectively. Moreover, G preserves 3, 
which can be defined in terms of A and 0, and it preserves false, V, and 3, 
in view of Remark 7.5. 
We note that Top is a subcategory of Dog, but not a full subcategory. 
10. THE TOPOS ASOCIATED WITH A DOGMA 
If 01 and /3 are sets of types PA and PB respectively, we write 
axfl.=.((x,y)~A x BIx~cr:hy~&. 
A relation p: p -+ 01 is a triple (p, 1 p /, 01), where 1 p / < 01 x j3. Thus 1 p 1 is a 
set of type P(A x B). In particular, we have the identity relation 1,: (Y + 01, 
the converse p-1: 01+ /3 of p: /3 -+ 01, and the relative product p * CC y  + (II of 
p:fi+aanda: y+j3, where 
Il,l .=.{(x,x)~A x Alx~or}, 
IP-ll .=.{<y,x)~B xAl<x,y)~lplL 
I P * * I -=* Kx> z> E A x C I A,, (3, Y> E I P I A <Y, z> E I (J I>. 
Sets and relations form a category. We are interested in the subcategory of 
sets and functions, where p: /3 + 01 is called a function if 
that is, if 
I-- v,,, (Y -5 B * &,,4 (x7 Y> E I P I), 
I 43 I G I P--l *P I, I P *p-l I G I 1, I* 
LEMMA 10.1 A function p: /I -+ CL is a monomorphism if and only if 
P -‘*p*=.la. 
Proof. Assuming this condition and p * u .=* p c 7, we immediately deduce 
0 . =. 7. Conversely, suppose p is mono. Consider the set 
y’=’ Ip-l*pI 
.=-KY,Y’)EB xBlL,(x,~)~l~l A<x,Y’)EIPII. 
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Define u, 7: y + fl by 
Then 
I u I *=- {<Y, <Y,Y’)> EB x (B x B) I <Y,Y’> EY), 
l~l.=.{<~‘,(~,~‘~)~B~(BxB)l<y,y’>~y}. 
I~*01 .=.{<x,<Y,Y’)>EA x(B xB)l<x,~)~l~l A<Y,Y’>EY), 
If *?I *=a KG <Y,Y’)> E A x (B x B) I (2,~‘) E I P I A <r,r’> er>. 
Since p is a function, it follows from the definition of y that p * (J -=* p * 7, 
hence that a .=- T. Therefore y < 1 1s 1, hence y .=a 1 1, I. 
The following result is due to Volger, but we give our own proof. 
PROPOSITION 10.2 The sets and functions of a dogma form a topos. 
Proof. To obtain the Cartesian structure we define 0,: a + 1, r$&: a X p + a, 
Ir,,,: a X j9 + p a.3 fOllOWS: 
1 *=-{XEl 1 true} ={OS, 
~O,~~=-{O,}Xa=(O1,x)E1 XAlxEa], 
1 %B I .=*{<x,<x,Y>>EA x (A x B)IxEaAyEBI, 
1 %,B I *=*(<y,<x,y>>~B x (A x B)IxEaAyEI% 
To these should be added the rule 
where 
I<% $>I *=* {<<%Y>, s E (A X 4 X c I <% 2) E I ‘P IA <Y, z> E: I$ I>. 
The equations of a Cartesian category are easily verified. 







The two equations of a predogma are easily verified using Proposition 8.4. 
607/36/2-3 
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Finally, we define true: l--t S2 by 
1 true 1 .=- {(true, O,)}, 
and it remains to check (*) to (***) in the definition of an elementary topos. 
(c) We claim that x: 01--+ Q is a characteristic function of ker X: Ker x -+ (Y, 
where 
Kerx’=.{~~A13t,n(t~(t,~)~I~I)), 
I ker x I *=* t<x, 4 E A x A I LQ (t A <G 4 E I x I)>. 
Indeed, suppose p: /3 + 01 is such that x * p a=- true * 0, , then 
Ix*pI *=*{(true,y>EQ X BlyEft?}. 
We may define 6: ,+I + Ker x by 
f .=* US I P I, Ker x1. 
This is easily seen to be the unique function for which 
ker x * .$ -=a p. 
(M) Suppose p: p -+ 01 is a given monomorphism. We claim that it has 
a characteristic function char p: a-+ 9, where 
Indeed, define I: j3 + Ker char p as above by I 5 I a=* I p I, then 
l~-l*~l .=*Ip-l*ppI 
*=- I 18 I, 




*=a{(x,x)EA x A IxEKercharp} 
-=- 11 Ker char II I. 
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Therefore, 5 is an isomorphism, from which it follows that charp is a charac- 
teristic function not only of ker char p but also of p, 
(MM) Suppose X: CY + P is a characteristic function of the monomorphism 
p:B+01. Weclaimthatx.=*charp. 
Indeed, since equalizers in a category are unique up to isomorphism, we 
see that the function 5 defined in (*) is an isomorphism. Therefore, 
In other words, 
hence 
Icharpl~=~~<~,~)~~~~l~=~~~~(~,y)~IpI~ 
*=* (<t, x) E 9 x A 1 t = 3&Q (t’ A {t’, x) E 1 x I)} 
-=* ((4 x> E Q x A I (6 x> E I x I>, 
by Proposition 8.4, and so char p *=. X, as was to be proved. 
PROPOSITION 10.3. The topos associated with a dogma has canonical sub- 
objects. 
Proof. If a is any set of type PA, Sub a consists of all sets LX‘ of the same 
type such that a’ < a, together with the inclusion E: a’ -+ OL, where I .$I = 
{(x, x) E A x A I x E a’). In the remainder of this proof, we mostly ignore 5 
and regard a’ itself as the subobject of a, as is usually done. We shall check 
conditions (i) to (v) of the definition of canonical subobjects in Section 9. 
(i) Let p: /I + a be a monomorphism in the topos associated with the 
dogma a, where a: 1 + PA and 4: 1 -+ PB. We claim that there is a subobject 
& a’ + a and an isomorphism p such that 6 * p *=. p. Indeed, let 
and 
a”=‘{XEA13YEB(X,y)EItLI} 
IPI *=*{<~,y>fA xBl<%y)~l~lI). 
It is easily seen that p is an isomorphism (see the proof that f is an isomorphism 
in condition (M) of Proposition 10.2). 
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(ii) Clearly a! < 01. 
(iii) I f  00 < 01 and 8’ < /3, then 01’ x B’ < OL x /I, as 
{(X,Y)EA xBIxEdhyEj3’}<{(X,y)EA XBlxEahyElq}. 
(iv) I f  LY’ < 01, then Pa’ < Par. Indeed, 
pa’ .=. {x E PA 1 x c a’} 
< @EPA / xccl> 
.=. pcu. 
(v) If  0~’ < LY. and 0~” < CZ’, then cleariy (Y” < 0~. 
As far as I can see, none of the results in Section 10 depend on the axiom of 
extensionality. 
11. TOP AS A REFLECTIVE SUBCATEGORY OF DOG 
Let T(a) be the topos associated with the dogma GE We shall exhibit an 
orthodox functor H: a--+ T(a) which will be seen to have the expected universal 
property. 
We define H on objects by 
H(A) . =. (x E A 1 true}. 
It is immediately seen that then 
H(1) .=. 1, H(A x B) .=. H(A) x H(B), 
H(Q) -=. S2, H(PA) .=. PH(A). 
We define H on morphismsf: A -+ B by 
I Wf)I *=. gqhf 
.=.{(y,x)~B x Aly=fx}. 
One easily checks that 
H(1.J = lam 3 Wgf) = H(g) * H(f ), 
f-W,) = OH(A) 9 
etc. Thus H is a preorthodox functor. To show that it is orthodox, we utilize 
Remark 7.7 and verify that it preserves true and =. (It is here that extensionality 
comes in.) 
Indeed, it is easily seen that I H(trtle)I *=’ [ true 1. To see that H preserves =, 
we must check that H(S,) is the usual equality in the topos T(a)), that is, the 
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characteristic morphism of the diagonal <l,(,,j , lHtA)): H(A) + H(A) x H(A). 
This is a consequence of the following two statements, whose verification is 
left to the reader: 
(9 WA) * <kd ,bfd .=- true * 0~~4) ; 
(ii) if H(S,) * <p, u> a=- true * 0, , then 
THEOREM 11.1. For any dogma Ol (with extensionality) there exists an orthodox 
functor H: Ol-+ T(g) such that, for any topos 8 and any orthodox factor 
G: a+ 8, there exists a unique orthodox functor G’: T(O?) + d which preserves 
canonical subobjects and such that G’H = G. 
In other words: T is left adjoint to the forgetful functor from Top (with 





Proof. How to define G’ on objects ? Let a be any set of type PA. The 
inclusion of 01 into H(A) is given by the monomorphism va: a + H(A), where 
lyal -=.{(x,x)~A x Alx~a}. 
qW has characteristic function char TV: H(A) + 52, where 
1 char qa 1 *=* {(t, x) E Q x A 1 t = 3Z,EA <x, x’) E 1 p. I} 
.=-(<t,s)~Q.x AIt=(x~a)]. 
Let a: 1 -+ PA correspond to a(: A -+ X2, then this may be written 
hence 
1 char ‘pa 1 v-0 graph (Y(, 
Moreover 
char pa *=* H(a’). 
Ker H(a() .=- {x E A I &o (t A <t, x) E I char vU I)} 
-=.{x~Al ZltEI)(t A t =(x~or))} 
e=-(~~Ajx~a} 
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and similarly 
ker IX(&) -=. vu. 
Since G’ is supposed to preserve kernels, we must have 
G’(cpJ *=. ker G’H(J) 
=. ker G( a() 
.=. Pa ? say. 
We are thus forced to define G’(a) as the domain of the kernel of G(d). 
How to define G’ on morphisms ? Consider a function p: ,9 -+ OL, we shall 
define G’(p) as the unique morphism h: G’(p) --+ G’(a) such that 
(9 t- VWW (dv, PSY) f WI P I). 
To justify this definition, we shall prove 
(a) that there is a unique h satisfying (i), 
(b) that G’ so defined is a preorthodox functor which preserves canonical 
kernels (see Lemma 9.2) and that G’H = G, 
(c) if G’ is an orthodox functor such that G’H = G, then h .=. G’(p) 
must satisfy (i). 
(a) By definition of pLs , we have 
It follows that 
that is, 
G(/3)( ps . =. true OGcB) . 
t- VWW G(BY PSY = true, 
(ii) t- Vvs~~(~) PBY E G(B), 
But, since p is a function, 
Applying the orthodox functor G to this, we obtain 
t--t,eod~ E G(B) * %a(,, <x, Y> E ‘31 P ID 
Hence, by universal specification, for y  of type G’(B), 
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Therefore, in view of (ii), we have 
‘-Vwcw %cm <x, PRY> E ‘31 P 1). 
By Theorem 8.3, there exists a unique g: G’(p) + G(A) such that 
Now 
(iii) + VyGG~(~) <sr, PBY> E WI P I>. 
+v gy E ‘34 
hence 
and therefore 
W) gy * = -y GW gy 
*=ey true 
‘=ey true o,y,,y, 
G(a()g *=* true Oc,(B) . 
Since pa: G’(a) -+ G(A) is the kernel of G(a(), there exists a unique 
h: G’(p) 3 G’(a) such that &r *=- g. It then follows from (iii) that h satisfies (i). 
Moreover, since ,I.+, is a monomorphism, h is unique with this property. 
(b) For any object A of a, we have 
G’H(A) -=- Ker G(H(A)() 
*=- Ker G(true 0,) 
-=- Ker(rrue O,(,,) 
a=* G(A), 
by Lemma 9.1(i). 
It follows that G’(1) -=* 1 and G’(Q) .=. D. Moreover, 
G’(a x /3) -=* Ker G((a x p)() 
-=- Ker G(A(a( x /3()) 
*=* Ker(h(G(cJ) x G(fi())) 
a=* Ker G(a() x Ker GQV), 
by Lemma 91(ii). Furthermore, 
by Lemma g.l(iii). 
G’(Pa) *=- Ker G((Pa)() 
* =- G(Ker((Pa)()) 
- = - GP Ker( a() 
*=- PG Ker(a() 
*=- PG’(a), 
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Next, we shall show that G’ preserves canonical kernels. 
Suppose x: OL --f R has kernel p: /I -+ OL, then an easy calculation yields 
I P I .=. I % 1. 
Since 1 char p / depends only on 1 p 1, we have 1 H(p()/ -=. j char ‘ps [ . =. 
1 char p / *=. 1 x j. Therefore also p. * p .=. p,s and H(flt) x pa *=a x, the 
absolute values having been omitted since sources and targets agree. Applying 
G’ to these two equations, one obtains p$‘(p) .=* pLs and G(/Qo, .=* G’(x). 
It is now routine to verify that CL, ker G’(X) h as characteristic morphism G(j-30. 
Since CL, and ker G’(X) are both canonical subobjects, so is their composition, 
hence pL, ker G’(X) *=- ker G(,Y) *=. pB .=* pa G’(p). Since par *=a ker G(cx() 
is a monomorphism, we have ker G’(x) * =. G”(p) * =. G’(ker x), as was to 
be shown. 
So far we have only discussed the effect of G’ on objects of T(a). In view of 
Lemma 9.2, the following equations remain to be checked: 
G’(L) ‘=- lG’(,) , 
G’(p, t 9) -=- G’(v) G’(#) for functions r+~ and I,$ 
G’H(f) -=- G(f), 
GV,) ‘=’ oG’(or) , 
G’(n,,s) *=* ~o’(~),o’(a) , and similarly for n&a, 
G’<n #> *=a <G’(Y), G’(4), 
G’(@) *=. G’(v)*, 
G’(Q) -=* E@(o) . 
Now all these equations have the form 
G’(p) -=- h. 
Therefore, in view of (a), we only have to check the appropriate instance of(i). 




t.- V~~G(A) <G(f h x> E W H(f )I), 
hi(A) *=* G’(ql,,(&) -=* G&U)) 
*=. lG’H(A) *=. lG(A) 9 
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in view of the first equation, which we assume to have been proved. Now 
G(I H(f)l) *=. WY, x> E: B x A I y =fx>) 
*=- KY, x> E G(B) x G(A) IY = G(f)& 
in view of Corollary 5.4. Hence 
li <G(fh x> E ‘3 H(f)l), 
from which the result follows by universal generalization. 
We omit verifying the other seven equations. 
(c) Assume that G’ is an orthodox functor such that G’H = G. We claim 
that h .=. G’(p) must satisfy (i), that is 
WI P IN&‘(P), PIT> .=. tae Qm > 
or more explicitely 
w,~~)<G(I P I) %W , CJ&‘(P~ IQ)) *=* true OGW . 
Since G = G’H and CL, .=. G’(I&, this equation in d may be obtained by 
applying the orthodox functor G’ to the following equation in T(n): 
To prove the latter equation, we calculate the left-hand side, looking at the 
definitions of *, l , < ), H, and 0, . After some tedious details, which we 
omit, we find that the left-hand side is 
On the other hand, the right-hand side is 
(0, y> E Q x B I L 0, v> E true A <w, Y> E %> 
~=-((t,y)E:8XB~t=trueh(~l,y)EOB}, 
which reduces to the same thing. 
COROLLARY 11.2. If ad is a topos with canonikal subobjects, H: l4!+ T(Ol) 
is an equid.ence of categories. 
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Proof. Let G: a--+ 0Z be the identity functor. Then the theorem yields 
G’: T(a) + a such that G’H is the identity on GY. 
On the other hand, 
HG’((u) = H Ker(cJ) 
E Ker H(c6) 
.=- a’ 
for H, being an orthodox functor, preserves kernels up to isomorphism, as was 
pointed out in Section 9, and the final equality was established in the proof of 
Theorem Il. 1. 
If we knew that H preserved canonical subobjects, we could replace the 
isomorphism above by equality, hence the equivalence of categories by an 
isomorphism. Unfortunately this is not the case. For, if B is a canonical sub- 
object of A in 6l?, H(B) .=. {y E B 1 true) is a set of type PB, and this cannot 
be a canonical subobject of H(A), unless B = A. 
On the other hand, we can improve Corollary 11.2 by deleting the condition 
that G?! has canonical subobjects. This will be done in the next section, but the 
proof will be quite different. 
12. CANONICAL SUBOBJECTS MAY BE ASSUMED 
We recall T(a), the topos associated with a dogma, and H: a+ T(a), the 
orthodox functor studied in Section 11, which renders Top a reflective sub- 
category of Dog. We shall answer some obvious questions about H. 
PROPOSITION 12.1. For a dogma 67 the following are equivalent: 
(0) For each object B of 6Y, Lo is mono. 
(1) Foranymorphismsf,g:A-+Bin6&~if+V~’,,,fx=gx,thenf~==g. 
(bternal equality implies external equality.) 
(2) H: G?-+ T(GY) is faithful. 
(3) There exists a faitful orthodox functor G: a-+ 6, where 8 is an ele- 
mentary topos. 
Proof. We shall show (0) * (1) => (2) * (3) * (0). 
(0) * (1). Suppose t-VseA fx =gx, then w,fx =gx, hence b,,fx .=.z 
csgx by Corollary 7.2. By functional completeness, LSf *=. Lsg, hence f ‘=.g 
by (0). 
(1) 2 (2). Suppose H(f) .=. H(g). Then 
((y,x)~B x Ajy=fx).=.((y,xj~B x AIy=gx), 
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hence 
from which it easily follows that 
t- VZEA fx = gx. 
Therefore f . =. g by ( 1). 
(2) 3 (3). This is evident in view of Theorem 11.1. 
(3) * (0). From Isf *=* cBg we deduce that bGcBjG(f) .=- tCtBjG(g), 
since G is orthodox. Now 1c(B) is the singleton morphism in a topos, hence 
mono (see below), and so G(f) -=. G(g). Since G is faithful, f *=+ g. 
Given an object B in a topos, why is the singleton morphism ‘g mono? 
We shall first establish that our singleton morphism coincides with the usual 
one. 
The diagonal morphism (lB , lB): B -+ B x B is a (split) mono, hence 
P-regular; for in a topos, every mono is the equalizer of two morphisms into 
Q c Pl . Its characteristic morphism S, may therefore be calculated by Proposi- 
tion 8.2: 
rSB’ .=. (z E B x B 1 & (le , l&y = z} 
.=e((y,y’)~B x BIy=y’}. 
It has already been pointed out that then S; * = * tg . 
It is of course well-known that the usual singleton morphism is mono. For 
completeness we include a proof here. 
Suppose f, g: A + B are such that S,*f .=. Sg. Passing from A + PB to 
A x B --f Q, we obtain 
Multiplying by (1, g) on the right, we then get 
Mf, g> . =. Mg, g> . =. true 0, , hence f *=.g. 
We shall say that a dogma is descriptive if from t- VzeA 3!,,, p(x, y) one may 
infer that there is a unique g: A + B such that + VEA p(x, gx), that is, 
Y = gx . = ‘<Z.Y> P(X, Y)* 
PROPOSITION 12.2. For any dogmu aC, the following conditions are equivalent: 
(0) For each object B of aZ, Q,. *B + PB is a P-regular monomorphism. 
(1) fl is descriptive. 
(2) H: Ll+ T(02) is full and faithful. 
(3) There exists a fuIl.and faithful orthodox functor G: 02+ 8, where d is 
an elementary topos. 
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Proof. We show (0) * (1) * (2) 3 (3) => (0). 
(0) * (1). This follows from Theorem 8.3. 
(1) * (2). Recall that H(A) .=. {x E A 1 true}. Consider any function 
v: H(A) -+ H(B), then 
that is, 
By (l), there is a unique g: A + B such that 
Y = P ‘=‘(z,ar) (Y, x> E I yJ I, 
and from this it easily follows that 
i<Y,@EB x A IY =& .=. IVI, 
that is, / H(g)1 .=. / v I, hence H(g) .=. v. 
(2) * (3). This is evident. 






g *=* true O,, . 
Applying the orthodox functor G to this, we obtain a similar diagram in b. 
Moreover, 
‘G(f)’ -=* {v E PG(B) I L-m G(dy = 4, 
in view of Corollary 5.4. But then we know from Proposition 8.2 that G(L~) 
is an equalizer of G(f) and G(g). If G is full and faitful, Lo is already an equalizer 
off andg. 
The following result strengthens Corollary 11.2 and justifies our definition 
of the category Top. 
PROPOSITION 12.3. Every topos CV is equivalent to a topos with canonical 
subobjects; in fact, H: 6V-t T(d) is an equivalence of categories. 
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Proof. We know from the last two propositions that H: a+ T(G!) is full 
and faithful. We now claim that every object of T(a) is isomorphic to some 
object in the image of H. 
Suppose 0~: I+ PA is any object of T(a). Let m: B + A be an equalizer 
of 01’ and true 0, . We shall find an isomorphism p: OL + H(B). Take 
IpI .=.{(y,x)~B x AIx=my~x~or). 
Clearly, p-r is a function, but why is p ? We want to show that 
that is, 
I-- flzd xEci * 3!yeB~ = my, 
x E a I-= 3!,,, x = my. 
Now (u( is the characteristic morphism of m, hence, by Proposition 8.2, 
and, therefore, 
a:~=.{x~AI3~~~rny=x}, 
x E a i-n 3,, my = x. 
The uniqueness follows from the following known lemma, a proof of which 
we include for completeness. 
LEMMA 12.4. In a topos, m: B + A is a monomorphi.vm if and only if 
t-V (..v9EB~B (my = my’ * Y = Y’). 
Proof. Suppose the condition holds. Let f, g: C + B and take an indeter- 
minate z of type C. By universal specification, we obtain 
kz mf2 = mg2 * f2 = gz. 
Suppose mf . =* mg, then 
I- vzec mfx = mgz, 
by Proposition 1.1, hence’ 
+ Vzscfz = .g% 
and so f * =. g, by Proposition 12.1. Thus m is a monomorphism. 
Conversely, supnose m is mono. Let (f, g): C + B x B be an equahzer 
of h and true O,,, where / 
rhl .=.((y,y’)~B x Blmy=my’}. 
156 JOACHIM LAMBEK 
Then, for an indeterminate x of type C, we have 
that is, 
h(fx, gz) .=‘z true, 
mfz = tngz s=.~ true, 
so that mf .=. mg, by Proposition 12.1. Since m is mono, it follows that f . =. g. 
Therefore, h is the unique characteristic morphism of (f, f ), and so, by Proposi- 
tion 8.2, 
‘h’ .=. KY,Y’) E B x B I L, <Y,Y’> = <f,f>.+. 
Thus, 
<Y, Y’> e rh’ +<?I,!/‘> LC (Y, Y’> = <f%f~>, 
and therefore 
my = my’ f---<y,y~> Y = Y’, 
from which the condition follows easily. 
13. ADDITIONAL EQUATIONAL STRUCTURE 
In this section we consider predogmas and dogmas with additional equational 
structure. 
We recall that a Cartesian closed category is a Cartesian category in which 
every object B admits all powers BA with morphisms E~,~: BA x A + B such 
that Hom(C, BA) E Hom(C x A, B), whereas in a predogma this was only 
so for B = Q. Functional completeness holds for Cartesian closed categories 
(see [16]), but it p ermits an interesting alternative formulation: Given an 
indeterminate X: 1 -+ A and a polynomial f(x): C -+ B, there exists a unique 
h: C + BA such that f(x) *=.z cBsA (h, x0,). We write h .=. &f(x), and this 
agrees with the h-conversion of Church in the special case when C = 1. 
In the topos T(a) generated by a dogma rZ one may define 8” for sets 
,!l:l+PBandcz:l-+PAby 
In this way T(ad) is easily shown to be Cartesian closed, and so one recaptures 
the result of Kock [14] that every topos (as defined here) is Cartesian closed. 
Why did we not require that a dogma is Cartesian closed ? Because the 
canonical functor H: tX?+ T(U) constructed in Section 11 does not preserve 
internal powers, that is, in general H(BA) # H(B)H’A). This is also the reason 
why we wrote PA instead of SZA. 
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In [16], Theorem 4.2 asserts that functional completeness holds for 
Cartesian closed categories with additional equational structure, consisting of 
morphisms fi 1 + C, equations v(f) = $(f) for all f: 1 + C, and implications 
between such equations. Unfortunately the short proof of the theorem (on 
page 287 of the cited paper) contains an error, which was discovered by 
Obtutowicx. Presumably, the theorem is wrong in the sense in which it was 
intended, which required the equations to remain valid if f is replaced by a 
polynomial f (x). The theorem holds trivially if additional equational structure 
consists only of morphisms f: 1 -+ C and equations of the form ‘p .=. #. The 
difficulty with the theorem as stated was how to deduce from the fact that 
y(f) .=- 4(f) for all f: 1 + C that K&Z) *=a K&(P). In some examples this 
may be possible. 
Thus, in Example 4.6 of the cited paper, the additional structure consisted 
of finite coproducts. This structure may be presented by morphisms 
o-c, A+A+B, B+A+B, C” x CB + CA+B 
and equations to ensure that CO s 1 and CA+B g CA x Cs. Example 4.8 may 
also be vindicated, since the adjunction between VA and ?TZ*,~ can be expressed 
by equations as in Section 4 above. 
Functional completeness clearly remains valid for dogmas (or predogmas) 
with additional equational structure consisting of morphiis 1 + C and equa- 
tions q * = * #. What additional structure could reasonably be demanded of a 
dogma ? One would like to assure that the topos generated by it should have 
some of the additional structure one requires for the category of sets. The 
existence of finite colimits in a topos is assured by a result of Mikkelsen. There 
remain the following postulates a topos should satisfy to conform to Lawvere’s 
elementary theory of the category of sets: the axiom of Booleanness 
(1 + 1 g .Q), th e axiom of choice, the axiom of infinity, and the axiom which 
says that Hom(1, Sz) has exactly two elements. 
The axiom of infinity for a topos was originally stated in the form of the 
Peano-Lavwere axiom, but Freyd [9] showed that this is equivalent to the 
existence of an object N (not necessarily the natural number object) and an 
isomorphism N + 1 E N. The axiom of infinity and the axiom of Booleanness 
thus both have the form A + B s C, and we note that Hom(1, C) is nonempty 
in both cases. What equational structure in a dogma corresponds to this? 
The answer is given by Proposition 13.1 below, but first a definition. 
We call an object A of a dogma empt~.~ if Hom(1, A) is empty, we call it 
P-regular if lA: A + PA is a P-regular monomorphism. 
PROPOSITION 13.1. Suppose ad is a dogma in which all nonentpty objects are 
P-regular. If A and B are nonempty and K: A --+ C, X: B --+ C induce an iso- 
morphism PC Y PA x PB, then (C, K, h) is a coproduct of A and B. 
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Proof. We want to show that the mapping Hom(C, D) -+ Hom(A, D) x 
Hom(B, D) which sends h: C + D onto (hK, hh) is one-to-one and onto. When 
D is empty this is clear; otherwise L D: D + PD is an equalizer of II, w: PD + PE, 
say. Given f: A --t D, g: B -+ D, then (cDf, cDg) is in Hom(A, PD) x 
Hom(B, PD). Let #D be the one-to-one correspondence of this with Hom(C, PD) 
obtained by tracing 
Hom(A, PD) x Hom(B, PD) s Hom(D, PA) x Hom(D, PB) 
- Hom(D, PA x PB) z Hom(D, PC) = 
- Hom(C, PD). zzY.7 
Then we have to show that h’ .=. #*(LDf, log) factors through D, and this is 
done by verifying that uh a=- uh’. We shall skip the details. [First show that 
#D is the inverse of (Hom(!c, PD), Horn@, PD)). Then get u&K .=. vh’K and 
uh’h . =. wh’h’x and finally ++h’ . =. LpEvh’.] 
Instead of postulating a morphism PA x PB + PC and equations which 
it should satisfy, we may equally well postulate 
Here P is taken to be a contravariant functor. Indeed, this condition is 
surely necessary if (PK, Ph) is to have an inverse. That it is also sufficient 
follows easily from Theorem 8.3, in view of the observation that +c is a 
P-regular monomorphism; in fact, it splits. 
Proposition 13.1 leads to a formulation of the Boolean axiom which says 
that truth functions are determined by their values at trlre and false. Not 
unexpectedly, this is equivalent to 
where, of course, 7 t is short for t =S false. 
Proposition 13.1 leads to a formulation of the axiom of infinity which is a 
little bit stronger than the conjunction of the following two conditions: 
(It also says that every element of N is either 0 or a successor.) In a dogma, 
these two conditions already allow us to define the set of natural numbers (a set, 
not a type) as the intersection of all those subsets z of N such that 0 E z and 
z Z s-4. In a topos, sets and types are the same thing, that is, objects of the 
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topos, and we may assume without loss in generality that N is already this 
intersection. Thus we have the classical axiom of induction: 
where 
WV zepN ((0 E .a A z c s-12) * VZEN x E z), (114 
s-lrJ .=. z {x E N 1 sx E z}. 
Not surprisingly, (1 la) to (1 lc) imply the Peano-Lawvere axiom, as may be 
shown. We summarize the results of our discussion: 
PROPOSITION 13.2. A topos is Boolean ;f and only if it satisfies (10). It has a 
natural number object if and only if it has an object (N, 0, s) sutisfydn (1 la) and 
(11 b). (N, 0, s) is a natural number object if and onZy ;f also (11 c). 
In order to discuss the axiom of choice for dogmas, we shall say that an 
object A of the dogma is equipped with a choice morpksm fi PA + A provided 
Of course, this implies that Hom(1, A) is nonempty, since Hom(1, PA) is 
nonempty. 
PROPOSITION 13.3. For a Boolean dogma 6?! the following two statements are 
equivalent : 
(1) Every nonempty P-regular object has a choice morphism. 
(2) Epimorphisms split in T(@. 
Proof. Assume (1) and let I: /3 + 01 be an epimorphism in T(a), where 
0~: 1 -+ FA and 8: 1 --t PB. Without loss in generality we may assume that B 
is nonempty and P-regular; for /I is isomorphic to 8’: 1 + PPB, where 
B’ *=*{{Y)EPBIYEPI 
-=.{wEPBI 3YEe(y~/3 A e, =(y})). 
By Lemma 13.4 below, we have 
that is, 
where 
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Now let f: PB -+ B be the choice morphism for B, then 
that is, 
]$I *=*((y,x)EB x AIxEarhy=fe(x)}, 
then it is easily verified that p * 9 .=. 1, , and so (1) implies (2). 
Conversely, assume (2), and suppose that A is nonempty and P-regular. 
Consider the morphisms p: /3 ---f OL in T(a), where 
LX~=.{UEPA~~~~XEU}, 
,~-=.{(u,x)EPA x A~xEu}. 
IpI -=.(<v,(u,x))~PA x(PA x A)Ix~u~u=v}. 
In view of Lemma 13.4, it is easily seen that IJJ is an epimorphism. Therefore, 
there exists $: (Y -+ b such that q~ * # . =. 1, , that is, 
We may extend 4 to X: (U E PA 1 true} -+ c1 by arbitrarily setting ~11 = <u, a), 
where a is a given element of Hom( 1, A), in case --, 3,,, x E U. The formal 
definition of x is 
It is easily seen that 
hence it follows from Proposition 8.3 that there is a unique f: PA --t A such 
that 
t- VUu.P.4 <<%ffl>, u> E I x I, 
and one easily checks that f  is a choice morphism for A. Thus (2) implies (1). 
It remains to prove the following lemma, which is well-known. 
LEMMA 13.4. In a topos e: B + A is an epimorphism if and only if 
t- VZzsA 3 21E~ x = v. 
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Proof. Suppose the condition is satisfied and f, g: A + C are such that 
fe . =. ge. Then we easily obtain 
t- v,,, fx = gx, 
hence f . =. g, by Proposition 12.1 and so e is epi. 
Conversely, suppose e is an epimorphism. By functional completeness, there 
exists a unique morphism f: A + Q such that 
and it follows that 
fx .=e2 jVE8 x = ey, 
fey ‘=‘y true, 
hence fe - =. true 0, . =. true O,e, by functional completeness. Therefore, 
f -=. true 0, , and the condition follows. 
COROLLARY 13.5. For a Boolean topos (more gene-rallj, for a Boolean dogma 
in which all objects are P-regular) the following statements are equivalent: 
(1) Every rwnempty object has a choice morphism. 
(2) Epinwrphisms split. 
Actually, (1) can be reformulated without the condition that the object be 
nonempty: 
For every object A there exists a morphism g: PA x A + A such that 
The final condition which the topos of sets should satisfy is that Hom( 1, Q) 
has two elements. It is not difficult to see that this statement for the dogma ad 
assures that Hom(1, SZ) has two elements in T(a). The reason for this is that 
each morphism 1 -+ SL in T(G!!) has the form H(f), where f: 1 ---f D in L7, in 
view of Theorem 8.3 and the observation that 52 4 PQ is P-regular (in fact 
it splits). Unfortunately, the condition that Hom(1, Q) has two elements is not 
equational. 
14. FREE TOPOSES 
One may form the free dogma L)(S) generated by a category (or graph) 
Z using the methods of “deductive systems” as in [15]. As objects of 
D(S) one takes all “formulas” made up from objects of I, 1, and B with the 
help of the operations x and P. As morphisms in D(S?) one takes all proofs 
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of “sequents” A -+ B, regarding D(S) as a deductive system in which all 
morphisms X-t Y of 25 appear as postulates. Finally one imposes all those 
equations between proofs which are needed to ensure that D(s) is a dogma 
and that X + D(X) is a functor. (The last proviso is not riecessary if 27 is only 
a graph.) 
It then follows that T(D(I)) is the free topos with canonical subobjects 
generated by 9. 
In the same way one may form the free Boolean topos or the free topos with 
axiom of infinity or the free Boolean topos with axiom of infinity by first forming 
the free dogma satisfying whichever of Eqs. (10) or (11) are required. If one 
wishes to nail down N as the natural number object, one should impose (1 lc). 
Suppose we want to form the free topos with axiom of choice generated by 
the empty category. We first form the free Boolean dogma generated by 
the empty category and note that each object in it is regular and nonempty, 
in view of Lemma 14.1 below. Then we postulate a choice morphism for each 
object and form the topos generated by this dogma. 
LEMMA 14.1. In the free dogma generated by the empty category, all morphisms 
ta: A - PA split, hence all objects are P-regular and nonempty. Thus H is full 
and faithful for this dogma. 
Proof. We claim that for each object A there exists a morphism a,.,: PA + A 
such that aAba .=. lA . We construct ua as follows: 
g1 .xcz’ 0 Pl Y 
anu =.U true E u, 
UPA- ‘=.21 @EA I %,~AYEVA~EY~ 
uayfjw ‘=‘w <u.Ah E A I LB (x, Y> E W>,Q{Y E B I LA (~9 Y> c ~1). 
Here II, v, and w are indeterminates of types PQ, P(PA), and P(A x B), 
respectively. 
Suppose we want to form the free topos with axiom of infinity and axiom 
of choice generated by the empty category. We can apply the same argument 
as above, provided we know that the morphism Lo: N + PN splits. This can 
be proved easily with the help of Theorem 8.3, if it is known that N is P-regular. 
I do not know whether this can be proved in general. No matter, we can postulate 
a morphism a,: PN --f N such that uNIN =. 1, and then proceed as above. 
In the above dogma, ,p .=. Q surely means that the equivalence of p and 4 
is provable according to the usual rules of formal number theory, hence 
Hom(1, Q) is the Lindenbaum algebra for this theory. Now Giidel’s incom- 
pleteness theorem asserts that there are undecidable propositions, hence 
Hom(1, Q) has more than two elements. Can we form the free topos with 
axiom of infinity and axiom of choice and such that Hom( 1, Q) has two elements 
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generated by the empty category ? If this were possible, there would be a natural 
candidate for the category of sets, and this is probably too much to expect. 
While it may be difficult to produce a natural candidate for the category of 
sets which will satisfy classical mathematicians, the free topos with natural 
number object generated by the empty category looks very much like an 
intuitionist’s idea of a category of sets. 
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